

# IRANIAN'S CONSTITUTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS

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## ABSTRACT

*Constitutional court has three functions in modern nation-state where democracy is accepted as deep value by social consensus and furthermore by constitutional law. First, it deals primarily with constitutional law by its authority of checking ordinary law that coincides with constitution. Second, the check and balance system (separation of powers) has been preserved by this court. So far, it can be established by rule of law or has pivot role to guarantee L'Etat de droit. Third, individual rights and liberties shall be protected by constitutional court. In fact, it has duties to protect of human rights, liberties and democracy against act of government through illegitimacy law-making, arbitrary arresting and etc. In this paper, I am concentrating on the third duty of constitutional court. Therefore, I will survey this function in Iranian legal sphere between two revolutions (1906-1979). Methodology of paper is relied on empirical study that I have done the historical event in relation of human right and constitution.*

**Keywords:** *constitutional court, human rights, rule of law, democracy, constitutionalism*

## INTRODUCTION

The constitutional law is the foundation of modern nation-state, which is the result of a social contract between peoples, regardless of ethnicity, race, color, or other belonging; who seek social solidarity and life with a single flagship as national symbol within the geographical boundaries. This law shall guarantee their freedom and ensure peace and tranquility beyond the moral norms and religion, although may be the religion has a main role in construction of social

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contract. In such a way, the constitution shall be impartial in the religious conflicts and protecting the public interest and preventing the domination of a particular class on others. It should also provide sufficient guarantees to protect the religious and ethnic minority against the will of the majority. Thus, ethnicity, religion, and in particular the normative ethics as a normative source of the modern constitution are doubtful. The modern constitution attempts to guarantee of pluralism according to the principles of democracy, and it never demands the supremacy of a religion over others. Therefore, the modern constitution for nation-state making and national cohesion should not be based on an official religion. Although, the religion have had an undeniable influence on constitutional mobilization, but after establish the nation-state, it should be maintaining secularity. This idea never refers to the anti-religious concept of the constitution or its denial, but it means that the values have been enshrined by the constitution that derive from the principles agreed upon the formation of a political community in result of an inter-rational act in the historical context. Religion has a main role In Iranian constitutional law; in so far according 4th principle of this law, all ordinary rules should be coherent with Sharia (official religion) and etc. it may be limit the minority rights.

## **CONSTITUTIONALISM AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE**

Governing has been located at the core of public law which has regulated the relationship of the state and citizens. But this issue doesn't limited to national boundaries such as local development which it has tied with global governance that follows the universal values such human rights, global administrative values, due process and good governance. In recent decades, international organizations including the World Bank have offered a model of good governance and directions for development to developing countries. This template contains standards such as the rule of law, transparency, supervision, accountability and responsiveness that seems appropriate for development and democracy. But critics have argued that such programs exist in order to impose liberal values on the legal culture of other countries, in other words, the influence of western countries on the different legal systems that eventually will lead to the hegemony of western industrial states on the legal values of other less developed countries. In contrast, the participation of the least developed countries in global decision-making bodies that arise is the response to the above criticism. In general, contract-oriented approach is the starting point of the production of common values of human rights and its reflection on global governance. A fair contract is when a wide range of diverse global actors agree upon mutual legal concepts by designing mechanisms of participation. The general framework of principles for constitutionalism and global governance

can be deduced from these concepts. But creating such a discourse where administrative decisions take shape at a global level has serious obstacles in its way. These strategies can lead to equilibrium and mitigation conditions: pluralism, respect to cultural diversity and legal participation in global decisions without preconditions or imposition of standards and mutual recognition and understanding of local regulators as well as their involvement in decision-making have fundamental roles at different levels.

*“We must ensure that the fundamental principles of administrative justice are not undermined, that the ‘art of governance’ is considered a new. What does administrative justice require? What makes decisions at the collective or individual level accountable and legitimate? We have stressed that there are two main elements:*

- a) Participation in decision making - consultation and other fairness procedures;
- b) Resolution of disputes - mechanisms for the redress of grievances.

These two elements are the cornerstone of any constitution, the underpinnings.

On which government and politics should operate. Against such a constitutional background for public activity, law can provide the framework within which these principles are able to operate and are upheld. Because policy decisions are rarely straightforward and primarily involve values, rather than facts alone, there may be several reasonable policy alternatives which might be adopted for any given set of circumstances. Law can assist all groups concerned with the varying areas of public policy to establish the options, resolve conflict and set the standards of practice for an open and co-operative web of services” (Diane Longley & Rhoda James, 1999: 242-243). Therefore, it seems that the strong relationship between constitutionalism (in domestic law) and global governance is human rights. In other means, human rights are share area at this relation.

“In the present era of human rights supremacy, the best way to constitutionalize due process values or present them as ‘universal’ is in the guise of human rights. To pin them more securely into the human rights pantheon, a ‘dignitary’ explanation is often put forward in justification of due process rights. So Lawrence Tribe insists on the ‘intrinsic value in the due process right to be heard, since it grants to the individual or groups against whom government decisions operate the chance to participate in the processes by which those decision are made, an opportunity that expresses their dignity as persons” (Harlow, Carol, 2006: 206).

## **CONSTITUTIONAL COURT IN PLURALISM SOCIETY; UNIVERSAL VALUES AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY**

The dialectic relationship between the universal values and cultural diversity which leads to the re-creation of cultural and value-based pluralism requires greater tolerance from the parties to Human rights. If we could guarantee the rights of minorities and make the role of less developed countries prominent in administrative decisions-making across the world, then we could develop the concept of administrative justice. The universality of phenomena has been surveyed under metaphysical discussion and should be examined by inherent and incidental characters. The essence could be universal, while the incidental subjects are the function of time and place. Therefore, the claim of the universality of administrative justice is related to the separation of inherent and incidental characters. But there are doubts also about the principle of universality, on how we can accept the emergence of administrative justice as a priori? In fact, the concrete phenomena have always known to understand of universality. In other words, the existence of universality is introduction to the understanding of the objective function and concrete phenomena that is historical reduction. Another method that is initiated by Michel Foucault, moves from concrete or concrete functions and reaches universal thing, although he does not believe the certain universality (Michel Foucault, 2008: 11).

To answer the question whether the constitution justice has inherent character or incidental dimensions, which can be described as universal, we need to explain the dimensions and their implications. It seems “we can be defined by enumerating detailed and analytical viewpoints or common places to get definitions. If we access to this spine in conception of justice, we can use it as a general concept which is called universal justice (Ghari, Mohammad, 2011: 83). Constitutional justice is an interior and intuitive phenomenon that makes and revolutionizes the inter-rationales relationship. At the same time, the interior sense of administrative justice is an inter-subjective meaning and this concept has been produced in different historical periods, universality of this concept somewhat to mind. We believe, the constitutional justice is a concrete concept that is identified in the legal system. But this universality should not violate the rights of minorities and cultural and political diversity and also impose the hegemony of western values on other values in developing countries. In any case, it seems that cultural diversity is the opposite point of universal values. The recent idea has been exposed with serious criticism that it ignores cultural diversity in general culture, or following the overcoming of a culture or a certain value on others. No doubt that our contemporary world is diverse world that subcultures have presented more or less alive and active in

different cultures. Basically, because of the human element the nature of human societies has been tending the demand for diversity. It also cannot ignore the fact that the culture of each one may believe values, norms and customs of their own. Basically, diversity and plurality is rooted in human society nature. It also cannot ignore the fact that the culture of each one has different believe, values, norms and customs. But pluralism and cultural diversity does not necessarily mean violation and conflict of their value system. Is it possible to simply claim that diverse cultures necessarily associated with human rights norms, values and norms have their own systems and these systems are in opposition to each other? Even if some of the behaviors and customs in a particular society are conflicted with contemporary human rights standards, would you say, if something common in a society, which is justified and correct the behavior or norm? Is it necessarily the being of a norm means it is the right or saying that since it is so true? Those who put forward the idea of cultural relativism versus universality of human rights and stressed on it, It seems, on the one hand confuses to grasp the concept of culture and the other hand, they couldn't provide the defensive concept of ethics and social behaviors. Ethics forms an important part of any culture. Therefore, a prerequisite for cultural diversity- that is the opposition of cultural norms and values that is claimed by the universality of human rights opponents- There are various ethical systems not only diverse but are opposed in different societies. This means that behavior or particular norm may be true in a society and incorrect in another society. Cultural relativism based on moral relativism is based on an untenable epistemological assumption and it is; the impossibility of trade between cultures and even humans. On this view point, Cultures are not blind to each other and therefore cannot have a discussion with each other (Ghari, Mohammad, 2011: 11).

In this context, Kymlicka -theorist of minority rights- believes in the existence of two types of ethnic minorities' culture; national groups in a multinational state and ethnic groups in an immigrant community. Kymlicka justify the right of "self-governance" for the United Nations; can only be a guide to the direction in which the cultural diversity of the national diverse groups is outstanding within the community. Kymlicka argues that his belief in the justice of minority.

As a means of compensating the cultural inequalities unprotected culture minorities face should result in the endorsement of self-government rights for national minorities, and in ploy ethnic rights for immigrants. Whereas the first are intended to enable a nation to govern itself and maintain its own societal culture, the second are offered to help ethnic groups to express their cultural particularity while becoming full and equal members of the societal culture of

the majority, in other word to promote integration into the larger society, not self-government (Kymlicka, 2003: 31). He raised the issue of minority within the minority and just political accommodation of cultural diversity that seeks to reductionism of universality.

In national systems, administrative law functions within the framework of an accepted political system and constitution, to both of which it is very closely linked. The 'background theory' of administrative law reflects these outside values, making it difficult to distinguish the values and principles of constitutional and administrative law. Furthermore, the constitutionalization of norms in domestic systems aimed at allowing administrative law values and doctrine to transcend both the borders of public administration and private management and also of public and private law. In global space, where economic globalization, liberalization and privatization are so closely linked as to be indistinguishable, this progression finds an exact counterpart (Harlow, Carol, 2006: 208).

“The significance of constitutional protection is that all organs of government are amenable to constitutional review. If a Parliament passes legislation which infringes the right, a high court has the power to strike it down. Parliament is no longer sovereign. Likewise, all executive and administrative action can be challenged for breach of a constitutionally protected right. Importantly, the Bill of Rights also constrains the judiciary which must interpret and enforce the rights contained in the constitution” (Harris Michael & Martin Partington, 1999: 376).

This nation-state assumption is, of course, unproblematic as long as state and culture do coincide. But maintaining this premise in a multinational state is inaccurate and unjust. So Kymlicka's theory begins where the nation-state assumption has become anachronistic. Kymlicka reject this assumption, and develops a liberal theory of *multi*-nationalism, which starts with awareness that the homogeneous nation-state is a thing of the past (Helder De Schutter, 2005: 24).

## **RELIGIOUS MINORITY RIGHTS**

Religious minorities rights in Iran laws, before the Constitutional Revolution in 1906, legal status of religious minorities like other people mostly was function of political agenda of governments, individual attitudes and opinions of kings and rulers were local and also function of Muslim and non-Muslim Scholars in. After the victory of the Islamic Revolution in February 1978, in the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, religious minorities divided to 4 religions Zaydi Shiite and Sunnite religious minorities of known as

Zoroastrianism, Judaism, Christians (Armenians and Assyrians) were limited. Also these minorities are respectable in the law. They are free to do their religious works and in their personal affairs are acting in accordance with the allowed Regulations. In relation to minority rights, religious and national authorities and officials did the basic steps in recent years in better living of our fellow citizens of other faiths and religions that a prominent example of it is a government sentence of Leader of Muslim about that blood money of religious minorities is equal to Muslims, which in itself is something worth considering. The issue of minority rights and do not discriminate against them is such a matter that is considered hardly especially to day.

In the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, adequate attention is paid to compliance with the adaptation the form of Provisions of international treaties and binding instruments concerning human rights and freedoms recognized of the Declaration on the rights of minorities is shifted.

### **EMERGE OF STATE COUNCIL OF IRAN**

Iranian state council act had been approved by national parliament in 1960. For the first time, state council was named in Article 64 of the National Employment Law, that had been adopted in 1922, when the Office of the Prosecutor was in charge of the proceedings of government's staff and the departments of the ministries for violating the provisions of this law, so the state council and, in its absence, the Supreme Court will be cleansed. However, the existence of specialized courts to deal with claims and prevent the violation of the rights of people against the government was first approved by the Houses in Iran under the title of 'State Council' on May 7, 1960. But virtually a state council that could have been a major obstacle to the aggression and rape of the state and its practical application to the people's rights was never formed and remained on paper only.

### **GUARDIAN COUNCIL OF CONSTITUTION**

The first constitutional law of Iran -written text- was passed in 1906 after constitutional revolution. The most important thing was the change of absolute monarchy to constitutional monarchy in that it is a strong step to change of the legitimacy of state. The 36<sup>th</sup> principle of constitutional amendment provided; The monarchy is a divine blessing that is delegated to prince by the peoples, so many of king's authorities had delegated to democratic institution like rule-making that had assigned to national assembly. And more importantly, for the first time, separation of powers was accepted in the Iranian legal system.

This change in the source of the legitimacy of the state led to the emergence of a modern constitution in Iran's legal system, because it had broken the traditional beliefs about the king's authority and his powers. In other words, the Constitution has taken on a contractual aspect. 'This modern concept of the constitution marks a distinct break with the ancient understanding. Drawing on the metaphor of the body politic, the ancient idea of the constitution was bound up with the health and strength of the nation, and the constitution evolved as the nation increased in vitality. This was the sense of constitution Burke invoked when he suggested, in the context of French revolutionary developments, that 'the state ought not to be considered as nothing better than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee, calico, or tobacco, or some other such low concern, to be taken up for a little temporary interest, and to be dissolved by the fancy of the parties' (Loughlin 2010, 378). Constitutional revolution is important in this direction that to change the attitude of the king's (state's) divine legitimacy to democratic legitimacy. "The modern concept performs a critical function in public law: it provides the foundation of legal order and lays down the basic law of lawmaking, establishing itself as the pivot on which the legitimacy of legality turns" (Loughlin 2010, 379). It turns had happen in Iranian constitutional revolution in 1906.

However, there were points in the law that paid less attention to the rights of religious minorities. This reason was the controversy between the intellectuals and some religious scholars or in other words, the conflict between the constitutionalists and the sharia proponent. It struggle led to emergence of amendment in order to provide the opinion of Islamic jurist like Shikh Nori -leader of sharia proponent. The first principle of the Constitution amendment had determined that "the official religion of Iran is Islam and the way of Shi'ite (twelve Imams) that the king should be promoter of this religion. The second principle had established the new institution base on the fact that the 5 Islamic jurisprudents (Clergy) will supervise the laws is passed by the parliament. These two principles led the religious ideology into the modern constitution that we mentioned. But for some reasons that are not discussed here, the supervision of jurists on legislation was not carried out. This issue prevented the conflict between ideology and religious minority fundamental rights.

After the victory of the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the second principle of the amendment was revived in a new form under the title of the Council of Constitutional Guardians. This institution in addition to monitoring the law-making is the official interpreter of the constitution.

At this paper I endeavor to survey the structure and duties of the Guardian Council, the inherent dialectic in ideology and fundamental rights that both of



which are underlined by the constitution after the Islamic Revolution and also And we will also need to review the structure and functioning of this council to guarantee fundamental rights and ideology. Therefore, after the introduction, I will examine the conceptual framework of ideology in the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its foundations. In the third section, I will deal with the fundamental rights set forth in the constitution and the rights of religious minorities and the relation with the ruling ideology. The fourth part is devoted to the structure of the Guardian Council, and the next section I will discuss about the necessity of reconstruction of this institution and change it to the Constitutional Court. Finally, I will draw the conclusion.

Conceptual framework of ideology in the constitution of I.R.I The relationship between constitutionally protected rights and religious values is not only a question in relation to Islam, but to any religion. In countries with a strong consciousness regarding the religious foundation of the nation, the preamble may refer to a specific religion as one of the core values of the State. The recognition of a specific religion as a state religion in the constitution is not uncommon either (A.N. Thonbo, Lisbeth, 2012: 9).

Imam Khomeini- the late founder of the Islamic Republic- played a central role for “unifying in Islamic world” in explaining the ideology of the Islamic state (Muosavi Alkhomini, 2013). This is also mentioned in the preamble of the Constitution: “The revolution of Iran, which was a movement for the victory of all the oppressed peoples against the tyrant, that provided the continuation of this revolution both inside and outside the country, especially in the development of international relations with other Islamic and popular movements, it attempts to pave the way for the formation of a single, universal Ummah”. From the perspective of the founder of the Islamic Revolution, the Islamic government is attentive to all aspects of citizen and seeks to his happiness in the world and the Hereafter (Muosavi Alkhomini, 1999). In this direction, “From the point of view of Islam, the government does not come from a class position or individual or group domination...The mission of the constitution is to raise awareness of the constituents of the movement and to create conditions in which human can be cultivated with universal values and Islamic universality” (Preamble of Constitution).

The foundation of I.R of Iran is drawn by the second principle of constitution which base on Divine revelation and its fundamental role in expressing the rules, Imamate and continuous leadership and its fundamental role in the continuation of the Islamic revolution and the human dignity and his freedom associate with his responsibility to God. Therefore, the role of jurisprudence and “*fatwa*” in defining the ideology is acceptable in constitutional law of

I.R.I. The *fatwa* result of endeavors of the jurisprudent that means the ultimate effort to achieve God's command (Mohaghegh Damad, 2010). *Fatwa* and consensus in Imami Shi'ite thinking has been pivot role in constitution of political theory and formation of public law especially in making-structure of political institutions. It has an impression on decision-making of government and also on making political institutions. For example, the famous *fatwa* of *Mirza Shirazi* - Shi'ite jurist - subject to ban of Tobacco and other jurists *fatwa* had led to constitutional revolution in 1908. Also in attack of Halako khan to Baghdad city-state (656 CE), he made a question from jurists: the tyrant Muslim is qualified to ruling or just infidel? He could conquer with help of this *fatwa*.

Consensus is a main source of Shi'ite and Sunnah law but in opinion of Shi'ite jurists it is valid when refer to discourse of innocent Imam. Therefore, area of Shi'ite consensus is limiter than Sunnah Fiqh. Although Islamic state always have been influenced by both of them. Difference of *fatwa* and decree always is a challenge of Usul-al- Fiqh and political theory; *fatwa* is explained sharia subjection by jurist, while decree is an order base on public interest. Some of jurists like Ayatollah Kazem Tabatabaei –author of Orvatolwosgha-claim, decree of governor have priority on *fatwa* in Islamic state.

## **SHARIA, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTION**

Article 18 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights provide: "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance". Article 10 of chapter of Fundamental rights of the European Union say: "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right includes freedom to change religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or in private, to manifest religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance".

Fundamental rights have been announced in the third chapter of the Iranian Constitution under the title of the rights of the nation. It includes civil-political rights, social, economic and cultural rights as well as solidarity rights. "Instituting Islamic law as the principal source of law in a country may result in the discriminatory treatment of non-Muslim individuals living in that country. It could be argued that by recognizing Islamic law as a source of law on an equal footing with other sources, the assumption of primacy of one of the sources of law over the other is reduced and the supremacy of the constitution is

likewise reconfirmed” (A.N. Thonbo, Lisbeth, 2012: 11). The twelfth principle of I.R of Iran constitution recognizes Ja'fari Shi'ite as the official religion of the country, but followers of other Islamic religion are freedom in the proper religious practice. Despite this, the reality is that, in accordance with principles like 115<sup>th</sup> principle, it is not possible to hold political authorities such as the presidency for religious minorities and Sunni Muslims.

The constitution recognizes only Zoroastrian, Jewish, and Christian minorities and they are free their religious assignments (12<sup>th</sup> principle). Freedom of religious minority in hold of religious rites causes their monotheistic beliefs and their shared chapters with Muslims. In concern of other religious minorities whom are not recognized by constitutional law, Principle 14 of the Constitution refers to the human rights of non-Muslims: “The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Muslims are required to act with respect to non-Muslim individuals with good morals and Islamic justice, and to respect their human rights. This principle is in the hands of those who do not fight against Islam and the Islamic Republic of Iran”.

So in relation of ideology and fundamental rights, it seems that the public position and source should be distributed so far as maintain and reinforce the ideology. “The recognition of a specific religion as a state religion may result in certain challenges in relation to the status of other religions and may have a bearing upon the protection, promotion and fulfillment of human rights. Most importantly, the predominant position of a religion in a constitution and a state must never prevent the freedom of religion of persons belonging to other religions: Discrimination based on religion must be prohibited” (*Ibid*: 10).

## **STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF GUARDIAN COUNCIL**

Guardian council of constitution has established in 1979 according the principle no.91 that provide: “In order to protect the provisions of Islam and the constitution in terms of non-contradiction of the parliament's laws with them, a council called the Guardian Council is formed by the following composition;

1. Six of the jurists are fair and aware of the requirements of the time and issues of the day. These people are appointed by the leadership.
2. Six lawyers, in various legal fields, are among the Muslim lawyers who are suggested by the head of the judiciary to the Islamic parliament and elected by the Assembly.

Therefore, this council has 2 functions: guarantee of official religion (sharia) and it's operate as conservator of fundamental rights that protected by constitution. There are two function for perform of these purpose; participation

of this council on rule-making and interpretation of constitutional law. The composition of the members of the Guardian Council is such that it defends the ideology of the government, and this is done through two ways of monitoring on the legislative and constitutional interpretation. “A state religion may also have an adverse impact on human rights if religious texts and their interpretation by religious authorities are seen as legal sources of law that may prevail over human rights in the event of a conflict of norms. Religious texts (and their interpretation) as a source of law may have some shortcomings in relation to the rule of law principle: A rule derived from religious authorities might not be foreseeable and accessible and is potentially subject to inconsistent interpretation. In the same way, the recognition of religious authorities as the primary source of law may have an adverse impact on the constitutional protection of human rights if the constitution is subject to religious authorities in the event of a conflict, in which religious authorities are placed above the constitution in the hierarchy of laws” (*Ibid*: 10). However, due to violations of fundamental rights arising from the functioning of this council, no court has jurisdiction to prosecute. This issue becomes more prominent when it is supervise on all the presidential and parliamentary elections and referendum (Principle no.99). Also, representation’s candidate of the Parliament before the start of the election must be approved by the Guardian Council. And peoples are not approved by this council who cannot sue a court or legal authority.

## **RECONSTRUCTION, TOWARDS THE FORMATION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL COURT**

Procedural justice requires individuals to go to impartial tribunals for violating their fundamental rights. Constitutional court is a special type of court with jurisdiction of constitutional review. They are more typical of civil law countries than common law countries. “If a constitution is intended to be binding there must be some means of enforcing it by deciding when an act or decision is contrary to the constitution and providing some remedy where this occurs. We call this process ‘constitutional review’. Constitutions across the world have devised broadly two types of constitutional review, carried out either by a specialized constitutional court or by courts of general legal jurisdiction. There are however many variations on each model and some systems are even said to be ‘hybrid’ (Andrew Harding, 2017: 1).

Regarding the structure and function of the Guardian Council, the dialectical relationship of ideology and fundamental rights led to the consolidation of ideology unless this council has been reconstructed by the structural reform and maintaining its impartiality. Although in some political-legal systems, such as

France, political institutions have duties to interpret and oversee constitutional guarantees but in the legal system of Iran, considering the position of religious ideology in political power, In order to guarantee fundamental rights, we need independent institutions such as the Constitutional Court. Independence of constitutional institutions must be in both functional and structural independence and this point is not true about the Guardian Council. Obviously, the structure of this court in another article can be discussed, but what matters is its structural independence.

## CONCLUSION

The existence of constitutional courts with independent structure and function is the necessities of ideological and religious systems. Because at this system may be existed certain challenges in relation to the status of minority religions and may have a bearing upon the protection, promotion and fulfillment of fundamental rights. The conflict between ideology and fundamental rights should be given to arbitration in order to guarantee the values enshrined in the constitution. The Constitutional Court in ideological and religious systems will balance ideology and fundamental rights. It assists in the realization of procedural justice and protects individual rights. In the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, adequate attention is paid to compliance with the adaption the form of Provisions of international treaties and binding instruments concerning human rights and freedoms recognized of the Declaration on the rights of minorities is shifted.

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