THE DIFFICULTIES OF NATION-BUILDING IN SOMALIA, 1960-1990

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Abstract

Somalia is among those African states that are still facing many challenges in their efforts to build the fragile state bequeathed to them by the colonial masters since the 1950s. The period 1960 to 1990, represents a crucial era in Somalia's efforts in its nation-building project. Many factors both internal and external are responsible for the complications faced in the nation-building project by Somalia and Africa in general. Hence, a proper understanding of the actual interplay of those factors that poses a challenge to Somalia's nation-building efforts will help in understanding the causes of the state's failure, particularly in Somalia. While the internal factors have been given more attention, very little has been said about the role of the external factors, albeit, the effort has been made to investigate these factors. Thus, this article's principal objective is to shift from focusing exclusively on internal factors to an all-inclusive analysis of the challenges faced by Somalia. The article argues that it is the external influences that have worsened the internal factors which has played a crucial role in pushing Somalia to become a failed State. This article concludes that the view that the sources of Somalia's failure originated solely from the society's tribal nature is incorrect.

Keywords: Somalia, Africa, Fail State, Nation-Building, Internal and External factors

Introduction

For many decades what remains the true statement about Somalia is that it is a failed state which has continued to be associated with the 'Orthodox Failed State Narratives' (Verhoeven, 2009:406) and the methods adopted by the international community in state building ignored the nation's troubled past. Consequently, the contemporary international commitment that underpins these narratives of overcoming Somalia's crisis can be regarded as a source rather than a solution to the problem. Many kinds of literature of 'fixing failed state' and foreign intervention, proffer a solution that is often underpinned by the neoliberal or liberal peace's logic of hybridity, pluralism and diversity in recent ambitious attempts of rebuilding Somalia (see Ginty, 2015). Paris (2004) and Sisk (2013), explained the salient factors in the literature of state-making in Somalia, Afghanistan, Libya and Iraq such as foreign intervention based on the Western grand chessboard and economic determinism – under the pretext of governance, counterterrorism and humanitarian interventions – rather than the immediate considerations of those who were identified as stateless societies. Consequently, state making is the overall process that begins with standardisation to forge common parameters for state unity and identity. Along these lines, (Chabal and Daloz, 1999) argued that in the beginning, the state exists not to promote diversity but to organise policies – either by force or voluntarily – to be uniform in a real sense.

For instance, during the colonial period 1891 to 1960, the Somalis were divided into five sub-regions: British Somaliland (north central); French Somaliland (north-west); Italian Somaliland (south); Ethiopian Somaliland (the Ogaden); and the Northern Frontier District (NFD) of Kenya (Metz, 1992). It was in 1960 that the Italian Somaliland

and British Somaliland were merged into a single political entity and given independence, as the Somali Republic. Ignoring the history and kinship ties of the other three units by the colonialists, reflected the colonialist's arbitrariness in border creation in Africa. This and many other reasons that will be discussed later plunged Somalia, just within its first nine years of its independence, into territorial disputes with Ethiopia and Kenya, coupled with a grave difficulty in integrating the dual legacy of Italian and British administrations.

Likewise, General Mahammad Siad Barre seizes power on October 21, 1969, in a bloodless coup and established a military dictatorship that divided and oppressed the Somalis for over twenty-one years. He continued to maintain the control of Somalia's social system, using the divide and rule tactics by inciting one clan against the other, until the country became rife with inter-clan strife and bloodshed (Metz, 1992). Siad Barre's regime came to a disastrous end in early 1991 with the collapse of the Somali state (Metz, 1992). The period 1960 to 1990, represent a crucial era in Somalia's nation-building effort. Therefore, many factors that are both internal and external to the African States and Somalia, in particular, are responsible for such difficulties. Furthermore, it was the external influences that worsened the internal problem and played a crucial role that finally pushed Somalia to become a failed State, and further complicated Somalia's nation-building project.

Somalis have a unique cultural tradition and are supposed to be a stable society due to its sense of cultural togetherness. The question that one may ask, why states such as Ethiopia and Malaysia that host races with different languages, faiths and histories, live together without open confrontation while, Somalia which is homogeneous, failed to manage their political differences? Based on this observation, one may argue that diversity is better than homogeneity. Though Jean-Germain Gros argues that ethnic heterogeneity facilitates state failure, particularly the Somalian situation invalidates such an argument (Gros, 1996: 464). However, this article is not a comparative study, as it attempts to identify the actual challenges that made the Somalian state to fail. Henry Kissinger in trying to identify the major factors that pushed Somalia to fail, he said: "Unfortunately, the effort to set up a central authority in Somalia, much less democracy, comes up to be the historical reality (Kissinger, 2002: 265)." The effort being made here is to investigate both internal and external factors and some specific factors like Somalia/Ethiopia's militarism and the end of the Horn of Africa's geopolitical value. Thus, this article's principal objective is to shift from an internal exclusivity to inclusiveness in its analysis.

State Making as 'Nation Building': Theoretical Framework

Foreign involvement in the domestic affairs of African states and their nation-building project has not been without costs. Nation-building project, particularly in Somalia, has been subject to different explanation and various conceptualisations. Balthasar's (2014) 'rule of standardisation' is one of such conceptualisation that is considered to be quite relevant for understanding and analysis of various factors that are internal and external to Somalia. As of today, the point of reference within the literature of the modern political history of Somalia is the beginning of an accepted governance structure which was developed in the 1960s, when Somalia achieved its independence from both Britain and Italy, (Hassan et'al, 2017). The assassination of President Abdirashid Ali Shermarke on October 21, 1969, drew the attention of the public to the inability of the civilian regime that was initially supported by the military in seizing control in Mogadishu (Hassan et'al, 2017: 412). While trying to consolidate his military rule (1969-1991), Mohammad Barre instantly deposed the civilian regime and sought external support from the Soviet Union. Mankhaus (2009) and Retino and Shaw (2017) critiqued the existing literature on state building in Somalia for its heavy focus on domestic factors such as institutional and economic mismanagement and poor leadership and for downplaying the meddling of foreign actors in securing their interests which was as stumbling block to state and nation-building in Somalia. This article borrows the analytical concept of 'state making' that is best understood as a two-part process of rule standardisation' as proposed by Balthasar (2014) based on the forecasts in the Horn of Africa. The theory was drawn from the political ethnographic writings of Clapham (1996) and Anderson and Broch-Due (2000) on history, politics and philosophy of East Africa. Balthasar (2014) proposed two points in discussing the analysis of state authority in Somalia.

To him, firstly, state-making is similar to state-building in terms of institutional standardisation in which the rules of the game (written laws and political regulations) produced by political factions dominate and regulate all types of political relations in the society. Secondly, state-building traverses with nation-building. The point is that in this direction it normalises the national identity as a common idea of the state or the rules of the public mind (Hassan et'al, 2017: 412-3). On the other hand, in the wider literature of fixing failed states and foreign intervention, the solution proposed by the neoliberal or liberal peace logic are hybridity, pluralism, and diversity. This is to acknowledge the fact that political pluralism cements democracy in advanced nations, but the truth is that the initial state-making endeavours are not pluralistic, but there is a focus on the rules of state and nation-building as historically showed in

Thomas Hobbes' *Leviathan* and John Locke's *Two Treaties of Government* (Balthasar, 2014, cited in Hassan et'al, 2017: 413).

Applying this theoretical consideration of nation-building means that the various political groups need to pave the way for the acceptance of a state framework and authority that is less contested, by the majority and is united and credible in defending the nation-state from external and internal threats (see Young, 2004; Taylor, 2010; Hassan, 2017). Therefore, nation-building is the overall process that begins with normalisation to forge common parameters for state unity and identity (Hassan et'al, 2017). It is further argued that the state exists not to promote diversity, but to organise policies – either by force or voluntarily – to be uniform in a real sense. The salient institutionalist focus of state-building prevalent in the literature in Somalia, Afghanistan, Libya, and Iraq is another good example of foreign intervention as an important factor in nation-building. If internal factors such as societal nature, poor leadership and economic mismanagement have delayed the modern transformation of Somalia by preventing it from having a strong and functional central government after independence, then neo-imperialism in the form of foreign intervention by meddling in the internal affairs of developing states and proxy wars during the Cold War period (Nkrumah, 1974) deteriorated past and the present nation-building project in Somalia.

This paper argues that since Somalia has been portrayed as 'a nation in search of nation-building', attempts of its search for a standardised state framework and basis for central political authority has been concerted as a strategic political calculus rather than some form of intrinsic distinctiveness that bounds Somalia together at the time of independence. Recognising the roles of the foreign actors in hindering the struggles of various local political agencies in developing standardised rules and central political authority is crucial here. While we recognise the continued inability of local political agency in filling the vacuum of central and standard political authority and national ideology in unifying its imagined political community in Somalia, it is more pertinent than before to revisit the debate on the role of both internal and external factors for the Somalia's past and current nation-building problem. This shall serve as a reminder that the ongoing conflicts and perils in various parts of Somalia are still awash with weapons and past external prescriptions from the remnants of the domestic political problem exacerbated by the colonial and post-Colonial Cold-War politics in Somalia. The adverse effects of those factors are still being felt in Somalia. The discussion of this article is in four sections. The first introduces the background of Somalia's history and efforts at nation-building. The second conceptualises state making as nation-building. The third discusses the internal factors responsible for the difficulties in Somalia's nation-building process. The fourth explains the external factors behind Somalia's problems in nation-building, both at the global and at the sub-regional levels. Finally, it reflects upon the role of both internal and external factors in Somalia. The article draws on the consequences of external and internal factors to appreciate their pervasive features in the politics of Somalia.

Internal Factors

This following section discusses some of the major internal factors behind Somalia's difficulties in its effort at nation-building from 1960-1990.

Society's Tribal Nature

As mentioned above, the European colonizers' major goal was to erase society's inner solidarity and collective consciousness. In doing so, they divided the community into friendly and enemy tribes. They armed friendly tribes against the enemy tribes and purposely created an antagonistic relationship between the various tribes. Thus, the society's divisions originated from the Colonial divide and rule strategy. A good example of this is that in the early 20th century, the Somali clan of Biyo-Mal resisted Italy's occupation of its territory and the Italians armed another clan, Geledi to put them down. Therefore, Biyo-mal clan's revolt against Italy's occupation was quickly put down with the aid of the Geledi clan. Both the Biyo-mal and Geledi are two neighbouring Somali clans of the lower Shabbele Region, south of Mogadishu (Hess, 1996: 181) who were not in conflict. The Italians befriended the Geledi clan against the Biyo-mal because Biyo-mal clan had rejected Italy's occupation. Inevitably, this strategy led to blood feuds and fueled an endless tribal antagonism and suspicion across the country. The colonialists shattered the societal solidarity and created disunity. For instance, in 1908 when the Italians came to Southern Somalia, the first thing they did was to divide the society. Few tribes were divided into 577 sub-clans with 577 chiefs on government payrolls with salaries ranging from six to fifty rupees (Abdurrahman, 1992: 53). Nobody knew the population's size in 1908, but by the mid-

1950s, the people of Southern Somalia was estimated at 1,267,964 (Henze, 1988: 4). The question is what was the logic behind paying 577 sub-clan chiefs? It became apparent that Italy's intention was to create more sub-clans to weaken society's internal coherence in favour of sectarianism. In the Northern provinces, Great Britain did the same. Although the Isaq tribe is one entity, Britain subdivided them into three sub-clans and promptly signed separate commercial and friendship treaties with each. On February 28, 1886, Britain concluded a Peace, Commercial and Friendship Treaty with Isaq's sub-clans Habar Awal, Habar-Garhajis, and Habar Tol-Jeclo, (Omar, 2001:527-577). Britain's principal aim was to break up the society's structure into a new form that would be in line with their political interests. In other words, colonialism had purposely seeded inter-tribal antagonism by strengthening clan identification which intensified further antagonistic relation among the clans (Rashid, 2011). The splitting of a single ethnicity into many was a death sentence to the Somalis' zeitgeist or glue and erased a society's sense of commonality.

The Erosion of the Societal Collective Aspiration

The Islamist heritage and nationalists' failure played a crucial role in erasing the society's collective aspiration in Somalia. Historically, Somalia was in conflict with others, for example, during the pre-colonial era, Somalis collective consciousness existed, and they distinguished themselves from non-Somali peoples in the Horn of Africa. Consequently, the Europeans' first goal was to shatter this sense of common consciousness. However, because of their collective consciousness, they reacted to the Europeans' insults, first led by the Sheikhs who encourage zeitgeist, to embark on Jihad (Holy War) against those who attempted to occupy their lands. The Sheikhs were asking the society to adhere to Allah's Laws which allowed them to challenge the Europeans from the 1890s to 1930. Therefore, political Islam was the first instrument used by the Sheikhs to frame the people's political awareness.

Over the thirty years, many Sheikhs were killed or jailed by the Europeans. The Europeans were using modern weapons like automatic guns, while the Sheikhs were using traditional Somali weapons, including spears, swords, arrows and knives. The Sheikhs' defeat represents a significant turning point in the modern history of Somalia, signifying the Islamist's failure in Somali land. By the 1940s, Somalis were ready to accept the Europeans' secular political system. In a short period, their political awareness shifted from an Islamic perspective into a secularist view, and in 1943, thirteen young men (influenced by the Europeans' education system) came up with the idea to establish a forum or a Somali Youth Club (SYC) on May 15, 1943. The Club was a political platform, as in April 1947, the Club became a full-fledged political party and the name was changed from Somali Youth Club (SYC) to Somali Youth League (SYL), (Trunji, 2015:15). With that, secularism was able to replace political Islam from 1947 to 1977.

Furthermore, secularism was used as an instrument by the elite to fashion the people's political awareness. The nationalist's core objective was to reunify Somali ethnic people across the Horn of Africa. Their symbol, adopted on October 12, 1954, was the national flag with a Five-Pointed Star to represent the five regions. The Five-Pointed Star on Somalia's flag represents the five areas inhabited by the Somali people (northern Kenya, Ethiopia's Ogaden region, Djibouti, and north and southern Somalia) and symbolises the objectives of the pan-Somali movement (Norton & McMullen, 1993:171). Hence, Somalia's First President, Aden A. Osman, declared in 1965 that the reunification of all Somalis was central to the life of the nation (Lyons, 1994: 192). Similarly, Somalia's Premier Abdul Rashid further described the situation as a misfortune, and he wrote: "their neighbouring countries, with whom… we seek to promote constructive and harmonious relations are not our neighbours. Rather, our neighbours are our Somali kinsmen whose citizenship is falsified by indiscriminate boundary arrangement" (Lewis, 2002:179). The elite made a commitment to fight for a Greater Somalia by all means, including engaging in war. From 1960 to 1977, the state's primary policy goal was to establish a large military with advanced weapons to attain Greater Somalia. This aggressive behaviour led to isolating Somalia from other countries on the African continent. In the early 1960s, Somalia was a pariah state in Africa because of its revisionism. The problem was that the new state's political boundaries and its people's political aspirations were not in line with those of Somalia's neighbouring countries, particularly Ethiopia and Kenya. Somalia invaded Ethiopia from 1977 to 1978 to win back their lost territory.

Poor leadership

Since independence in 1960, Somalia has been ill-served by its poor leadership; the elite did not only fail to cure the society's antagonistic behaviour inherited from colonialists but, they were even fuelling it more. The elites' principal objective was to loot the public's resources and to divide the society. The political parties and the National Assembly became tools of corruption and nepotism. Lewis (2002) described the National Assembly as not only the symbol of free speech and fair play for all the citizens of Somalia but it was widely regarded, cynically, as a sordid marketplace where,

with little concern for the interests of those who had voted for them. Those in politics were in it for personal gain (Lewis, 2002: 206). As a result, the political parties proliferated from less than four political parties in 1960 to sixty-plus in 1969. Trunji wrote: ".... During the civilian regime, political administrators spent most of their time struggling for survival, because of squabbles within the ruling party, rather than focusing on more urgent and vital issues related to the well-being of the population as a whole"(Trunji, 2015: 418). Hence, the democratic political system became meaningless, and perhaps the most important actions were: (1) syphoning of the state treasury of US$8 million. (2) pressure on the Chief of the National Police Corps, General M. A. Muse, to use his forces and their resources to help those Somali Youth League candidates who were campaigning in tightly contested districts. (3) modification of electoral rules to favour the S.Y.L (4) the more than 1,000 candidates put forth by over 60 parties in the 123 seats; and (5) the death of nearly forty people, making the election Somalia's bloodiest (Samatar, 1994:115).

For the military regime, General Said Barre is a good example of poor leadership and factionalism. During his first term, (1969–1978), he promised to end tribalism. Tribalism was, therefore, condemned as the most serious impediment to national unity (Samatar, 1994:39). But he went ahead to favour his kinsmen. For that reason, his public words and actions were contradictory, and in fact, he was openly relying on these three clans - Marehen, Ogaden and Dhulmahante. According to the US Ambassador to Somalia in the 1980s, General Said Barre turned more repressive, more corrupted, and more centred on the interests of his Marehen clan. In the early 1980s the state's security commanders, including military, police, paramilitary, National Security Services, were all associates of General Barre's tribes (Aroma, 2005: 279). In fact, the military dictator was just applying the colonial powers' old strategy of divide and rule with the hope of prolonging his regime's hold on power (Adam, 1994:118).

Consequently, all marginalised tribes armed themselves against the state as the leaders persistently overlooked or ignored the fact that a tribal society is the most dangerous to lead. The population could at any time disown and divorce themselves from the concept of whole nationhood and revert to the tribes as a refuge (Qabobe, 2002: 23-24). In fact, the society's anti-state behaviour in the mid-1980s was the result of the regime's misgovernment. As in the 1980s, General Barre encouraged the clans of the north to fight each other, through granting bribes, investments and arms supply (Greenfield, 1994:110). Therefore, it is very reasonable to argue that the establishment of the clan-based political factions, including the SSDF, the SNM, and the USC were the result of General Barre's misrule. And by implication making the nation-building project more complicated due to a lack of trust within the society. Therefore, poor leadership led to an increase in the elite's power abuse, society's anti-state behaviours, tribal militarism, and, ultimately, the state's failure in 1991. And by implication making the nation-building more complicated due to lack of trust among the tribes and clans in the society.

External Factors

The following section discusses some of the major external factors behind Somalia's difficulties in its effort at nation-building from 1960-1990.

Aid Dependency

At the outset, let us investigate if the global powers' aid to Somalia especially from Italy (1960-1969), the Soviet Union (1963-1976), and the USA (1980-1990) was harmless to Somalia's people. Theoretically, foreign aid is very controversial. Collier (2007) asked if aid makes things worse. The answer is very controversial, and it depends on whom one asks (Collier, 2007:104). Nonetheless, this paper defines "foreign aid" as a gift or transfer from a powerful state to a weak state to interfere in their domestic policies: donors rarely give support out of charity, but rather give it to win friends and influence countries (Roskin and Nicholas Berry, 1990: 363). Furthermore, aid adds to an already complex situations, and such complexity does not end with its arrival or, indeed, absence (Peter, 2008:388). On the other hand, it can also be seen as a positive asset that will help the recipient's economy, but Somalia's total foreign aid dependency should be seen as a real threat to its political independence. More importantly, about 85 percent of her total development expenditure up to the end of 1969 has been externally financed (Mehmet, 1971: 3). During the military rule (1969-1991), Somalia was called the grave of aids. This further confirmed the "Dead Aid", the concept of Dambisa Moya, that aid dependency only further undermines the ability of Africans, whatever their situation, to decide on economic and political policies (Moyo, 2009: 67). Therefore, the Italian, the Soviet and the US foreign aids were undermining the ability of Somalia to be an independent state. They accomplished their intention of influencing Somalia's domestic affairs, in two abusive ways. First, they empowered a brutal dictatorship, and the more he received aids the more he denied his

people their rights; the more help a country receives, the less the government of that country has to answer to the people (Bandow, 1995). Secondly, the donors proposed much contradicted economic policies and because of their ill-advise, Somalia adopted a contradictory socioeconomic system. From 1960 to 1991, for instance, during the civilian era, the state's economic policies were in line with the Capitalist free market, while the state's defence and foreign policies were in line with the socialist view. Somalia was neither a Capitalist nor a Socialist state. In 1969, after the coup, General Barre rejected the mixed policy in favour of Scientific Socialism to claim that: "we are convinced that the only way to solve our problems is scientific socialism" (Pestalozza, 1974: 54). The Soviets' strategic aim was to influence Somalia's domestic politics, and as a result, George Ayittey (1994) said: "no one else in Africa seemed to enjoy the Soviets' friendship as did Somalia's military ruler General Barre". Consequently, in line with the socialist's economic model, government nationalised companies and corporations that provided essential services to the people (Greenfield, 1995). In fact, the socialist's economic measures were against the Somalis' economic nature as a nomadic society. Therefore, there was a big gap between the socialist's economic philosophy and the nomadic society's values, in Somalia. The Soviet Union was ready to bridge the gap in the supply of free food and fuel. Four years from its commencement in 1974, the Soviet aid to Somalia was 400 percent higher than in 1969. However, after Ethiopia's revolution and the Horn of Africa's strategic alteration, the Soviets suspended supplies to Somalia in favour of Ethiopia. This forced Somalia to annul its friendship with the Soviets on November 13, 1977. For a second time (1979-1990), Somalia's military ruler aligned himself with the US and signed numerous treaties. The most significant deal was struck on August 22, 1980. The agreement permitted the US military to use Somalia's military facilities. In return, the US asked Somalia's military ruler to adopt the capitalist free-market economic model. Thus, for the second time, Somalia became a Western experimental field to apply the capitalist's economic model to a nomadic society. This overnight change severely affected Somalia's economy which was already decaying due to the adherence to Soviet advice. For instance, through 1980-1990, the US pressured Somalia to accept the World Bank/IMF's Structural Adjustment Programs. The acceptance of this condition meant that the economic direction of Somalia was planned, monitored and controlled from Washington. In theory, the World Bank's primary job is to serve developing countries in development. However, these developing countries Finance Ministers had to sign pre-drafted rules which are numerous, but the most significant of these instructions required Somalia to privatise state's properties, promote trade liberalisation, create higher interest rates, and etc. The Soviets and the United States' economic advisors, with their arrival in Mogadishu, without wasting any time, were advising Somalia to apply their particular economic models and perspectives.

The Soviets encouraged Somalia to implement the socialist's economic model as the best to free themselves of the so-called bourgeoisie and, at a later time, the United States supported Somalia to liberalise its economic policy in order to receive much-needed foreign direct investment. In fact, the Soviets and the US financial advisors were ignoring the risks involved in their suggestions, and according to Bruce R. Scott, the idea that all countries must adopt Western policies to achieve Western levels of income often failed to consider the changes and political risks involved (Scott, 201:199). In fact, neither the socialist nor the capitalist economic models were relevant to Somalia's nomadic society and, therefore, Somalia's flip-flop between Moscow and Washington for foreign aids led it into a total financial negligence. According to Michel Chossudovsky, by the 1980s, following recurrent austerity measures as imposed by Washington, wages in the public sector collapsed to three dollars a month (Michel, 2011), although Somalia received millions from the Soviet and the US, Somali people never benefited from them. Frankly speaking, the US aid was far more harmful than that of the Soviets, as Somalia became far more impoverished by the mid-1990s. According to the United States' ambassador to Somalia from 1980 to 1990, "the government came begging to the aid trough, and we filled it. We have led them to a new dependency, not to independence" (Bridges, 2000: 200). Somalia, because of its foreign aid' dependency, was as an "experimental object" to Moscow and Washington.

The Cold War's Effects: Somalia as Chessboard of Major Powers

Externally, Somalia's geopolitical location played a crucial role in inviting global powers to intrude in the Horn of Africa's internal politics. The most important was the Cold War in 1947 as a new era dawned in the Horn of Africa to witness the departure of old colonial powers and the arrival of the new powers, the Soviets and the US. Therefore, the Horn of Africa, because of its immense geopolitical importance became a hot spot for the balancing of power throughout the Cold War era. Ruth Iyob confirmed that the Horn of Africa, besides its Horn-link perch on maps of continental Africa, its geography determines its policies as much as anything in its history or social makeup (Iyob, 1993: 107). Thus, the region is a very geopolitical entity in a wider context, and in fact, the area acts as the bridge that links the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea via the Red Sea. Zartman argues that the Horn practically makes part of the Middle East, the Soviet Union's border region and a home of the United States' economic and political allies.

Thus, the area draws much interest to the United States and the U.S.S.R (Zartman, 1991:156). The more superpowers lineup themselves with the region's hostile regimes, the more the region's conflicts increased.

Therefore, the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa witnessed the Soviet and American geopolitical contest throughout the Cold War from 1947-1989 (Roberts, 1999: 2). The superpowers were attempting to make sure that the region did not fall into the other's hands. Thus, the Cold War's immediate (bipolar) impact was to increase divisiveness among the countries. The Soviets and the US adopted the practice of proxy wars to avoid a total war and constrained themselves, as observed by Victor A. Kremenyuk, with these rules: (a) no direct use of force against each other, (b) don't rock the boat, that is, maintain the post-war world structure, (c) while both sides could count on each side to observe these constraints, both felt free to use all other means to achieve victory (Kremenyuk, 1991: 35). Subsequently, they exported their conflict to the region, including the Horn of Africa. Throughout the Cold War, one of the primary defining characteristics of their relationships with the third world was the continuation of a super power supply of free advanced weaponry. In fact, the high level of superpower military involvement earned the sub-region a nickname as the Horn of Conflict 'globally' (Mohamud, 2006:15). They transported their clashes to the Horn of Africa because of the region's geopolitical value. They avoided face-to-face conflict but provided weapons to respective clients thus engaging in proxy wars. In that way, the Horn of Africa's geopolitical value gave the region's military rulers, particularly those of Somalia and Ethiopia, a significant stake in the Cold War. According to David Latin and Said S. Samatar, there is a contest between the United States and the Soviet Union for military bases and other strategic stakes in the Horn region (Laitin & Samatar, 1977: III). Global powers, throughout the Cold War, were ready to make a deal with the region's dictators for strategic gain. George Alagiah pointed out that during the Cold War, from a strategic viewpoint, the United States of America and the Soviet Union fought over the region, competing for relevance in the strategic Horn of Africa (Alagiah, 2008: 90). These competitions provide them with the opportunity to interfere with the region's domestic policies. The US ambassador to Somalia Dan Simpson admitted that, the US wrecked some countries through wars for example Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa is a another area where much damage has been inflicted. The Soviets and the US were aligning themselves with the Horn's military rulers for military bases in exchange for arms and financial support. These alignments produced nothing else but an increase in the Horn of Africa's sister-state hostilities. As a result, Somalia became a chessboard used by the Soviets and the US as a battleground for proxy wars for over thirty years.

Regional Rivalry: Somalia and Ethiopia's Militarization

Somalia and Ethiopia's inter-state rivalry portrays an endless hostility that played a crucial role in pushing Somalia to become a fail state. Both countries are located in the heart of the Horn of Africa with a geopolitical value that attracted superpowers. As explained by Jackson in the Cold War era, the Horn of Africa attracted much attention by the superpowers scrambling for strategic advantage using military assistance as the prime instrument for achieving these ends (Jackson, 1984: 225). As a result, the region's military regimes received billions of dollars and advanced weapons. This enabled them to sponsor intra-state wars, as well as to attack each other. This was part and parcel of the superpowers' grand strategy to export their conflicts into periphery regions. For that reason, Somalia established one of the largest armed forces in black Africa. For instance, for the period of the Somalia-Ethiopia war, Somalia-owned 200 tanks, 310 APC, 170 Anti-Aircraft Batteries, 24 Rocket Launchers. Also, Somalia's national army was equipped with more than 50 Soviet-made MiG fighters. In fact, no other country in Africa was so militarised, as the Horn of Africa. The Soviet Union and the US spent billions to arm the Horn of Africa's military regimes. After all, the Soviets' role was exceptional as they sent US $13 billion in military assistance to the Mengistu regime (Ofcansky and Berry, 1993: 291). The situation in Somalia was the same. The country had served the interests of the Soviet Union and the US. Unfortunately, it did not benefit from its allegiance to either of the blocs at the end of the Cold War. When General Barre's regime fell, there was more ammunition in Somalia than food and medicine (Ihonybere, 1994). Unbelievably, General Barre's stores were filled up with more ammunition than food and the General was using these ammunitions to oppress his people. Thus, the superpowers' free weapons were complicating the matter. The region's military rulers were ready to fight proxy wars on behalf of their sponsors and to oppress their people. The policies of those superpowers, as described by Berridge have to do with 'arms buildups that generated an arms race, alliances and counter-alliances and bids on the part of a state to expand its influence into regions hitherto ignored, which led its rivals to do the same' (Berridge, 1997: 72).

Additionally, because of the abundance of free weapons and cash, the Horn of Africa's military regimes failed to seek legitimacy via democratic means and preferred to rely on assistance from their patrons. In fact, nobody knew

exactly how much in total was spent on their defence sectors. However, according to the Department of State's Report, Somalia's central government's budget for security in 1984 stood at USD380 million. This number is extremely high for a developing country like Somalia. Ethiopia's defence spending was high too. According to Addison and Murshed (2001) between 1984 and 1991, Ethiopia spent an average of 46.6 percent of the country's total current expenditures in defense whereas social spending accounted for 17 percent, which is a sad testament. In fact, the superpowers were sponsoring killers. The collapse of the Ethiopian and Somalian nation-states in 1990 was mainly because of their high militarization policies aided by the Cold War politics (Agyeman-Duah, 1996: 3).

The End of the Horn's Geopolitical Value

The demise of the Cold War in 1989 substantially decreased the Horn of Africa's geopolitical value. Before, both the Soviets and the United States were assisting and holding together the region's weak states. However, on April 14, 1988, the Soviets announced plans to reduce military assistance to combat zones, including the Horn of Africa, and two months later, on July 26, 1988, President Gorbachev informed Colonel Mengistu of Ethiopia that the Soviet Union was unwilling to increase its military assistance to Ethiopia and alternatively asked him to seek a "just solution" to the dispute in Northern Ethiopia (Ofcansky and Berry, 1993: 296). Next, the Soviets withdrew from the region. Subsequently, the US abandoned its military bases in Somalia as the Soviets were no longer threatening the sources of energy and military interest in the Arabian Peninsula. This meant that both superpowers were no longer ready to bribe their clients. On this account, Eric E. Wolf wrote: "as we know, the end of the Cold War witnessed not only the implosion of the Soviet bloc but also the end of superpower patronage and supervision over political and military clienteles" (Wolf, 2003: 64). As a result of their abandonment by former sponsors, some weak states fragmented or collapsed entirely (Dobbins, 2005: 219). This implies that the end of the Cold War was a key factor in pushing Somalia to a fail state.

With the end of the Cold War, the survival of allied governments in small nations around the globe was no longer important, to the United States national security. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact made the military justification for channelling billions of dollars into the hands of regimes that were often the worst sorts of kleptomaniac autocracies completely disappear (Bandow, 1995). In 1991, neither the U.S. nor the Soviets desired to obtain Somalia's geopolitical location for the balance of powers, as they did before the end of the Cold War. There was an argument that as soon as the superpowers stopped rendering support, their Horn of Africa's military clients collapsed in 1991 (Mohamoud, 2007: 15).

The Collapse of Military Rulers

Consequently, with the demise of the Cold War in 1989, global powers stopped their aid to Somalia's military rulers. The system that was holding the Somali junta since the 1969 coup was selling its geopolitical position since its independence. And therefore, as we have stated earlier, there was a direct link between General Barre's political survival and the United States' foreign aid (Mohamoud, 2006: 122). Similarly, John Young and John Kent further argued that the next foreign aid cut-off was one of the primary causes of Somalia's state collapse (Kent and Young, 2004: 616). In 1989, as soon as the US stopped it's foreign aid to Somalia, the brutal military regime collapsed in less than a year.

Indeed, it was the global powers' seeking influence and control of the strategic world areas which led to the sustenance of unpopular regimes, including military dictators that are willing to serve their interest in return. Such is what was witnessed in the Horn of Africa. This development contributed more to the Horn of Africa's military rivalries among the countries there, mostly serving as a proxy to superpowers. Over three decades, the Horn of Africa was a region of competition, especially between Ethiopia's military rulers, Colonel Mengistu of Ethiopia and General Barre of Somalia. At the end of the Cold War and because of the region's geopolitical devalue, their patrons abandoned them, and as a result, both states failed in 1991 as they got permeated with conflicts beyond their control. This is particularly with Somalia where America had to withdraw its forces and had suffered humiliation at the hands of General Aideed's forces. Subsequently, the Horn of Africa's long-time military rivals fled into exile, Colonel Mengistu of Ethiopia fled to Zimbabwe, while General Barre fled to Nigeria where he passed away in 1993. By and large, these military rulers' collapse had direct links with the Cold War's ending as with the Horn of Africa's geopolitical value. Additionally, Ethiopia failed to preserve its territorial integrity, and it lost Eritrea. The division of Ethiopia into many states was one of Somalia's major goals, and on April 27, 1993, Eritrea announced its independence from Ethiopia. As

for Somalia, it not only failed to achieve Greater Somalia but also failed to retain its territorial integrity. On May 18, 1991, Somaliland (Northwestern Provinces) announced its independence from Somalia. All in all, besides numerous attempts, said to be made by Barre in building a better Somalia, foreign intervention under the short-lived presence of the Soviets led Somalia to become a failed state.

Conclusion: Somalia Still in Search of Nation-Building

This article has demonstrated that both internal and external factors have contributed to Somalia's failure in nation-building. From the external dimensions, Washington's and Moscow's role in the national economic and foreign policies exacerbated the existing political problems and prevented the state from developing a standardized political order that could unify the nation. Specifically, given the salient character of the Soviet's guidance during Said Barre's reign, it was confirmed that although Somalia is often presumed as unwilling or unable to govern itself due to many of the predicaments that plagued the Horn of Africa, these problems are not solely the product of Somalia's domestic challenges, but also the destructive nature of foreign interventions in African affairs (see Schmidt, 2013).

While it is certainly true that there are less political options for Somali leaders to manoeuvre or defy foreign pressures, it will be a complete denial to suggest that the breakdown of Somalia in 1991 was not about the marginalisation of Africa in global politics and international relations, or to simply concur with the idea that Africa is a passive bystander to its problems, as fixed by the preordained nature of a Westphalian state system and as created by the Western geostrategic interest in Africa since the dawn of European expansionism. Rather, we largely agree with the pragmatic advice, which we substantiated from one of the influential pundits of African politics, Jean-Francois (Bayart 2009), that Africa was never being marginalised by the global actors in world politics and their continued presence and interactions with African politics, history, ideas, people and culture were informed, mediated and negotiated by the local collaborators (Somalia's political agency).

In struggling to secure superpower support toward realising Said Barre's ambitions in building a future for greater Somalia, he unintentionally created a radical socialist state system which altered the existing customary values and traditional social relations that pitched the zero-sum game of modernity versus traditions, secularism versus Islamism that was eventually rejected by many Somalis (see Barnes & Hassan, 2007). This triggered a long distrust and disconnection of various political clans and segments in the Somali society toward the idea of central state authority and grand political order, as prescribed by the UN, the US and the African Union since 1991 (Lindley, 2013). The paper rejects the Henry Kissinger's view, which said that the sources of Somalia's failure originated mainly from the tribalistic nature of the society. This essay makes the proper examination of the effects of external factors on Somalia's problem of nation-building. The main argument is that both internal and external factors have played a crucial role in pushing Somalia to a failed state status in Africa. Those painstaking years and grave mistakes of Said Barre of neglecting the people did aggravate the already fragmented Somalis' political community making it easy for them to retreat to Islamism and radical interpretations to cater for the harsh political reality of livelihood in a troubled Somalia.

Notes

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